













Abstract:  This article looks at the continuing fascination with the idea of monarchy in Iran, dismissed 
and condemned after the revolution but gradually rehabilitated through an engagement with the 
Shahnameh and a reinvigorated interest in ancient Iran. The interest in Sasanian Iran, as the cradle 
for the development of Islamic civilisation, has in turn enabled a popular reacquaintance with 
Achaemenid Iran, previously frowned on for its association with Mohammad Reza Shah but legitimised 
by the enthusiastic endorsement of the figure of Cyrus the Great by President Ahmadinejad. This 
political myth of Cyrus the Great reflects the changing political dynamics of the Islamic Republic and 
the need to appropriate popular nationalist iconography to the state. 
 
 




Royalty has rarely been more popular in Iran. As paradoxical as this statement may first appear 
it should come as little surprise that after nearly 40 years of Islamic Revolution and Republic 
the public are reacting against an official ideology that has ostensibly defined itself against the 
institution of monarchy. Part of this reaction is a consequence of the continuing romance of 
monarchy that is deeply embedded within Iranian culture and which is reflected in the 
widespread fascination with the ‘national’ epic, the Shahnameh; a fascination that despite 
initial reservations, the political establishment of the Islamic Republic, has come to embrace, 
if for no other reason than its literary merit. But the interest goes further and into areas that 
highlight not only the contradictions of contemporary political culture but the difficulties in 
imposing state narratives on an unwilling population.  
 Interest in the Shahnameh can be explained as a form of cultural retrenchment; a 
reversion to tradition in which the more knowledgeable may point out - despite the title - is not 





fairly described as ambiguous about monarchy and its benefits. Not that this has prevented a 
commercial preoccupation with cultural artefacts on the pre-Islamic monarchy with busts of 
various Sasanian and Achaemenid kings on sale to an enthusiastic public (see Figure 1). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE. LEGEND: Figure 1.  
  
But there is something altogether more interesting going on when this romantic 
nostalgia transfers itself to an interest in the immediate pre-Revolutionary monarchy. For many 
in Iran today, the Pahlavi monarchs - Reza Shah (r. 1926-41) and Mohammad Reza Shah (r. 
1941-79) - offer a stark and often favourable contrast with the present, facilitating a growing 
nostalgia for what is perceived as a simpler time, when the economy appeared healthy and 
Iran’s status in the world, was by all accounts high1. Indeed, if Iranian history, and its imperial 
history in particular, fuelled by a socially reinvigorated nationalist narrative, provides a 
mythological refuge from the distress of the present, its most recent manifestation has been re-
energised both by a generation that retains memories of that earlier ‘halcyon period’, and by a 
new generation, whose fertile nationalist imagination both complements and compensates for 
the memory of others.  
 This imagination is paradoxically reinforced by the near obsession of the contemporary 
elite for a royal past which it seeks to condemn, and an imperial past that it frequently wants to 
emulate. The didactic drive to educate the public about the wickedness of the Pahlavis is, thus, 
not only undermined by the tendency of the public to react against any such attempt, but by a 
curious affection of the regime elite for the imperial past which identifies past grandeur with 
 
1  ‘Why Iranians are lapping up Shah memorabilia’, The Guardian, 17 June 2015; Iranians 






monarchy in a manner which would not have been entirely unfamiliar to the Pahlavis 
themselves. Perhaps the obvious case of this has been the regime’s attempts to harness the 
renewed interest in the figure of Cyrus the Great (559-529BC), the founder of the first Persian 
Empire, the imperial ancestor most dear to the heart of Mohammad Reza Shah, and 
increasingly ‘rehabilitated’ by Iranians as the ‘father of the nation’.2 Long viewed with 
suspicion by the authorities of the Islamic Republic largely because of his association in the 
public imagination with the last Shah, his rehabilitation was signalled in grand style by 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who sought to definitively appropriate Cyrus to his own 
political advantage. The parallels with the Shah were striking, if the exploitation distinct, but 
there could be little doubt as President Putin filed past a mock-up of the Persepolis frieze on 
his way to a joint press conference in Tehran in 2007, that the Achaemenids had been brought 
back in from the cold (see Figure 2). 
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A royal progress of rehabilitation 
 
This was, of course, the culmination of a process that had emerged from the shadows of the 
Iran-Iraq war. At the onset of the revolution, the Achaemenids, and the monuments associated 
with them, had been so closely identified with the last Shah that any association short of 
outright condemnation was regarded as effectively blasphemous. In the heat of revolution, 
some limited voice was even given to those who felt that the Achaemenids were a wholly 
invented tradition imposed on Iran by Westerners in a bid to diminish the ‘real’ history of Iran 
 
2  According to Herodotus, The Histories (London, 2003), p. 452, the Persians regarded Cyrus 





which was in turns Islamic but also intriguingly, if tentatively at first, encapsulated in the myths 
of the Shahnameh. For a brief moment – though some have held fast to this belief – Cyrus had 
to give way to Jamshid. What this did, of course, was to facilitate the return of the Shahnameh 
as a legitimate text not only as a receptacle of the Persian language but as a repository of Iran’s 
traditional, pre-Islamic history. Talk of kings in this particular context, as an exercise in Iranian 
authenticity – as opposed to the pastiche of the Pahlavis – became both tolerated and 
increasingly accepted back into the cultural framework of Iran. Consequently, some of the more 
zealous revolutionary actions, such as the renaming of Kermanshah province as Bakhtaran (on 
the basis that it was more authentic), were after decades reversed: an early example of the limits 
of government ideology. It was justified on the grounds of restoring the traditional name, but 
that tradition had been reflected in the unwillingness of the locals to use the new ‘traditional’ 
name. 
 The government of the Islamic Republic was relatively quick to recognise that rejection 
was a poor and largely ineffective substitute for a more managed control and appropriation, 
though even this approach was to have its limitations. Despite these constraints on the 
pedagogic use of the past in the service of controversial Islamist narratives, at the very least 
such a didactic approach provided a cover for the gradual rehabilitation of Iran’s imperial and 
royal history. The monument that proved too seductive to avoid remained Persepolis – a site 
that some revolutionaries had wanted to destroy – but now served as a template to warn against 
the dangers of decadence. There was a convenient duality to this narrative. One related to the 
collapse of the Achaemenids and of Iran’s ancient civilisation in general, as a result of moral 
collapse, with the more immediate narrative related to the fall of Mohammad Reza Shah.  His 
association with the site was writ large in the public imagination because of the ‘greatest party 





the foundation of the Persian Empire.3 Thus, when President Rafsanjani became the first senior 
official of the Islamic Republic to visit Persepolis in 1991, his visit was laced with a heavy 
layer of educative moralising about the futility of earthly power and the dangers of decadence, 
though more critical eyes noticed with opprobrium that Rafsanjani could not completely 
disguise his sense of pride. 
 It was a limited if important opening, and while in previous – pre-revolutionary 
moments – the government enthusiastically endorsed and supported Achaemenid narratives, in 
the revolutionary present this enthusiasm would be left in large part to society, that due to its 
new found literacy, given added momentum by the advent of new technologies, provided new 
energy to this renewed interest in the ancient past. For many young Iranians disillusioned, and 
increasingly disenfranchised, this interest in the ancient history of the country fuelled and 
supported – in a safe and non-political way – a growing nationalist sentiment and movement. 
Popular histories provided a new historical mythology to reinforce the cultural renaissance that 
in time would seep into a more political narrative which the regime would seek to harness. For 
the time being, however, Rafsanjani’s visit had enabled a discussion, even if the focus of this 
was a movement from below rather than an orthodox narrative dictated from above. 
 Indeed, for the establishment itself, the focus of official research remained firmly 
Islamic, but perhaps more pointedly towards the origins and rise of Islam in Iran. Like the 
historians of Christianity in Europe who were obliged through the need for context to study the 
Roman Republic and Empire, so too did a new generation of enthusiastic religious historians 
Iran turn to the Sasanians Empire to understand the context of Iran’s submission to Islam. Like 
their pre-revolutionary pre-cursors, they ended up discovering and arguing things that were not 
 
3  Calculating 2500 from 559BC would actually take us to 1941, the date of the accession of 
Mohammad Reza Shah (a coincidence that he is unlikely to have missed). The year 1971 was largely 
adopted for logistical convenience and the date had been postponed several times. In 1976 when the 





to the taste of the ulema, who taking their lead from Ayatollah Motahhari (one of the leading 
ideologues of the Islamic Revolution and a keen critic of the ‘secular’ historians who had 
emerged in the twentieth century) sought to find evidence to support their view that Iranians, 
faced with a morally bankrupt Sasanian order, had turned willingly to the reinvigorating faith 
of Islam.4 Moreover, this change in the political and religious order had marked a seminal and 
decisive break in the history of Iran.  
 Much to the chagrin of the authorities, this was not what the researchers discovered. 
Not only did the Sasanian empire cast a long and influential shadow on the formation of the 
Caliphate but it was not at all clear that Iranians had been either willing or speedy converts to 
the new faith. The process was a good deal more complicated and slower than the official 
narratives would have people believe, and while this did not necessarily substantiate the 
arguments put forward by Hossein Zarrinkub in his controversial 1951 study Two Centuries of 
Silence, the opprobrium that text had received from the authorities meant that it received 
renewed interest from a new generation of scholars.5 Such scholarly debates were not the 
provenance of popular histories, but they did help erode the official positions of rejection and 
didactic moralising, towards increasing appropriation.  
 Indeed, the Sasanians, in their conflict with Rome, had much to commend them in the 
eyes of many members of the new revolutionary establishment, involved as they were in their 
own confrontation with the new ‘Rome’, and they had little problem in espousing the virtues 
of Shahpur I or Khosrow Anoushiravan – or for that matter Parviz. Perhaps even more peculiar 
 
4  For a discussion of these developments, see K.S. Aghaie, ‘Islamist Historiography in Post-
Revolutionary Iran’, in Iran in the 20th Century: Historiography & Political culture, (ed.) Touraj 
Atabaki (London, 2009), pp. 244–7. Motahhari’s book was Khadamat-e Motaqabel-e Islam va Iran 
(The mutual contributions of Islam and Iran to each other). 
5  A. Zarrinkub, Do Qarn Sokut (Two Centuries of Silence), (Tehran, 1384/2006), p. 372; this 
edition, the twentieth, published in the Islamic Republic comes with a preface by Mottahari to warn 
the reader of the ‘dangers’ of the text, a ‘health warning’ that probably served to enhance the 





was the way in which the revolutionary establishment sought to justify Islamic norms of 
behaviour (such as the wearing of the veil) on the basis that these had been common Iranian 
(i.e. pre-Islamic Sasanian) practices, adding  a distinctly nationalist lustre to a debate about the 
Islamisation of society. Moreover, it was not uncommon to find scholars of all political hues 
argue that the relationship between religion and politics had always been intimate in Iranian 
politics, as witnessed in the Sasanian Empire and expressed in Ardeshir Papagan’s advice to 
his successors on religion and politics being brothers to one another, with politics being the 
pillar and religion the foundation.6 Some might have noted that it was the very intimacy of the 
reactionary Zoroastrian priesthood with the Sasanian dynasty that had weakened the state in 
the face of the Arab Muslim onslaught, though this observation and argument was rarely 
allowed to get in the way of the broader message which drew not only on earlier Western 
analyses of the nature of the empire (an analysis that would change in due course) but mirrored 
early Islamic readings which likewise provided a justification for the borrowing of ideas.7  
 In practical terms this political appropriation enabled a broader acceptance of the 
Sasanian empire and its principal protagonists, not least because the Islamic Republic could, 
somewhat ironically, claim to be an authentic successor, in a way that the Pahlavis, who had 
been disrespectful of religion, could not. Indeed, while the Sasanian ‘Shahanshahs’ were 
praised, the two Pahlavi monarchs, were in official discourse, deprived of the title Shah, as if 
to accord them the title would be an affront to the dignity of the term, and instead referred to 
as the ‘first’ and ‘second’ Pahlavi. Iranian monarchy, correctly understood, as a pillar and 
protector of religion, might thus be rehabilitated. The Pahlavis, as something altogether alien 
to Iranian culture (essentially Western implants), were not monarchs in the traditional sense 
 
6  The relevant passage has been quoted to good effect in S.A. Arjomand, The Turban for the 
Crown (Oxford 1988), p. 76. 
7  See J. Malcolm, Sketches of Persia (London, 1827), pp. 135–40, which recounts the Caliph 





and, therefore, remained beyond the pale. More astute observers may have noticed that this 
rehabilitation of the monarchical idea emerged parallel to the growth in the spiritual and 
political power of the Iranian supreme leader, whom critics attacked as seeking to develop an 




The rehabilitation of Cyrus the Great was, however, to be an altogether different affair, with 
consequences that were potentially more far reaching. Not only was the figure of Cyrus too 
closely associated and identified with the Pahlavis, and Mohammad Reza Shah in particular,9 
but he, along with other Achaemenids, did not feature in traditional historical narratives derived 
from Iranian mythology and sourced largely (though not exclusively) from the Shahnameh. 
Prior to the Islamic Revolution, some more radical Islamists even went so far as to argue that 
Cyrus was a fiction invented by Jewish thinkers.10 It was certainly true that the figure of Cyrus  
due to his presence in both Biblical and Classical texts was much more a fixture in the Western 
than he had ever been in the Iranian imagination. While Cyrus, or Koroush in the Persian 
pronunciation, had never been entirely forgotten in Iranian historical narratives, he had over 
time been demoted to a more subsidiary status in relation to the great kings of the Shahnameh, 
as Iranian historians sought to integrate what they had garnered from Biblical sources with their 
own traditional narratives.11 In the Western imagination in stark contrast, the founder of the 
 
8  The first charge in this respect was directed towards President Rafsanjani whose affection for 
ceremonial drew the sarcastic epithet, ‘Akbar Shah’. 
9  One might go so far as to say that in political terms he had become a surrogate for 
Mohammad Reza Shah. 
10  See S. Khalkhali, Ayyam-e Enzeva: Khaterat-e Ayatollah Khalkhali avalin hakem-e 
dadgahha-ye enghelab (Tehran, 1380/2001), pp. 223–306. 
11  Mirkhond, History of the Early Kings of Persia: from Kaiomars, the first of the Pishdadian 





Persian empire was an iconic figure, the liberator of the Jews from Babylon and epitome of 
wise governance made apparent in Xenophon’s (largely fictional) Cyropaedia; a mirror for 
princes that enjoyed widespread popularity in early modern Europe.12 As Western contacts 
grew more systematic and regular in the nineteenth century and archaeology developed along 
with the new discipline of history, so too were Iranians, and Iranian nationalists in particular, 
re-acquainted with the figure of Cyrus the Great: an individual of such popularity in the 
Western canon that his re-appropriation by the Iranians was not difficult. Indeed, a common 
appreciation for Cyrus the Great provided a means by which Iranians could gain easy access to 
the civilised salons of Europe, while Europeans found it easy to introduce Iranians - and their 
king in particular - as the heirs of Cyrus.13 
 The real problem with Cyrus the Great was that there was so little evidence of his life 
other than what could be gleaned from the writings of Classical authors and the Bible that it 
was largely a matter of conjecture as what his character and motivations might have been. The 
archaeological evidence added little other than some understanding of the nature of his royal 
compound at Pasargad and, of course, his tomb, which was both imposing and enigmatic. It 
may be argued that the enigma of Cyrus was his greatest asset, since it provided his successors 
with a relatively blank template onto which they could transpose their own interpretations.14 It 
was generally accepted that the scale and nature of Cyrus’ conquests meant that he was an 
impressive personage and one about whom his contemporaries - including many who might be 
 
original, see Mirkhwand, Tarikh-Rawżat aṣ-ṣafāʾ fī sīrat al-anbiyāʾ w-al-mulūk w-al-khulafā (The 
History the Gardens of purity in the biography of the prophets and kings and caliphs), (ed. and 
corrected) J. Kiyanfar (Tehran 1380/2001), 1, pp. 731–2. 
12  See J. Grogan, The Persian Empire in English renaissance Writing, 1549-1622 (London, 
2014), and P. Springborg, Western Republicanism & the Oriental Prince (Cambridge, 1992). 
13  E.G. Browne, A Year Amongst the Persians (London, 1893), p. 109.  
14  The first example of this being Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, though Reza Zarghamee has argued 
that Xenophon’s reading may have been his own understanding of the contemporary Persian (heroic) 





considered his enemies - had a highly favourable impression of his political skills and insights. 
It takes some political foresight if not outright genius to be considered so favourably by both 
Greeks and Jews, such that the latter would consider him one of two ‘Messiahs’. What gave 
added momentum to these positive readings was the chance discovery in 1879 of a clay cylinder 
in the ruins of the ancient city of Babylon, known to posterity as the Cyrus Cylinder. It says 
something of the relative paucity of the archaeological evidence that this chance discovery and 
its subsequent decipherment were to have such a decisive impact on the popular appreciation 
of Cyrus. It is also a testament to the reality that history - and archaeology - remain matters of 
interpretation, and abuse. 
 The initial impact of the discovery of the Cyrus Cylinder was both modest yet important 
in providing the first archaeological evidence that the textual evidence may be broadly correct. 
Combined with the textual evidence, however, especially that provided by the Bible, the 
cylinder took on more mythical proportions and became a centrepiece of Mohammad Reza 
Shah’s appreciation of his Achaemenid predecessor. Mohammad Reza Shah was not the first 
Iranian to laud the achievements of Cyrus the Great, but he was the first to make such overt 
political use of them, and his apparent affectation for personal identification with Cyrus drew 
wry comments from supporters and critics alike. The Israelis, for example, were acutely aware 
that any association with Cyrus would help curry favour for them at court, and it did not go 
unnoticed that while the crown prince was named ‘Reza’, his second name was ‘Cyrus’. It was 
not until the 2500th anniversary celebrations in Persepolis and Pasargad in 1971 that the depth 
of the Shah’s feelings became explicit.  
 The Shah had wanted to commemorate the accession of Cyrus the Great as a festival of 
Iranian nationhood and an exercise in dynastic nationalism, though as his reign progressed, and 
the economy became more stable, greater emphasis was placed on the dynastic and personal 





commemorations being scheduled for October 1971, some four years after his own coronation, 
on a date that bore little relation to the precise chronology. The celebrations were conceived on 
a grand scale, with associated academic and artistic events but the focus - and the criticism - 
was on the main events to be held in Persepolis and Pasargad:15 a march past of Iranian armies 
past and present - starting somewhat surreally with the first man - together with a curiously 
constructed homage to the dead king at his tomb in Pasargad by a clearly emotional Mohammad 
Reza Shah. Extrapolating from what limited evidence existed about Cyrus’ character and 
motivations, the Shah decided to add to the template provided by the classical texts and the 
Bible (along with his reading of the Cyrus Cylinder - translated into Persian as the Cyrus 
Declaration - manshoor-e Koroush) the characteristics of a thoroughly modern ‘enlightened 
despot’. Thus, in the most frequently cited extract from his speech, the Shah describes Cyrus, 
in the best tradition as of enlightenment discourse, as a liberator and humanitarian: 
O Cyrus, great King, King of Kings, Emperor of the Achaemenians, monarch 
of the land of Iran. I, the Shahanshah of Iran, offer thee salutations from myself 
and from our nation. We are here to acclaim Cyrus, the Great, the immortal of 
Iran, the founder of the most ancient empire of the World; to praise Cyrus, the 
extraordinary emancipator of History; and to declare that he was one of the 
most noble sons of the Humanity. Cyrus, we gather today around the tomb in 
which you eternally rest to tell you: Rest in Peace, for we are well awake and 
we will always be alert in order to preserve your proud legacy. We promise to 
preserve forever the traditions of humanism and goodwill, with which you 
founded the Persian Empire: traditions which made our people be the carrier of 
message transmitted everywhere, professing fraternity and truth.16 
 
Although most critics concentrated on the reference to Cyrus to ‘rest’ since ‘we are well 
awake’, it was perhaps the explicit references to enlightenment narratives of emancipation that 
are most striking insofar as these statements reflected the Shah’s perception of himself 
transposed onto this most illustrious of predecessors. In sum, Cyrus served as a mirror onto 
 
15  For details, see the recent excellent book by R. Steele, The Shah’s Imperial Celebrations of 
1971 (London, 2020). 





which the Shah could both reflect and magnify his own glory. The Shah was, of course, by no 
means unique in seeking to exploit for political purpose the achievements of a predecessor, but 
the scale of his ambition was impressive, and while some were moved by the speech, a great 
many more regarded it as faintly ludicrous as well as presumptuous.17  
 All this was to be attended by assorted heads of state and their representatives - the 
greatest party in the world - and perhaps the most significant if under-appreciated gathering of 
world leaders in recent memory. Emotional speeches aside, criticism concentrated not 
unreasonably on the cost of the whole event, and also on the fact that for reasons of security, 
most ordinary Iranians were kept well away - to say nothing of the many potential 
‘troublemakers’ who were arbitrarily detained. A festival of Iranian nationhood somewhat 
perversely excluded Iranians, a fact to which the Shah himself appears to have been oblivious.18  
 The Shah had hoped that the festivities would signal the arrival of modern Iran on the 
world stage, even if this meant in practical terms inviting the world to Iran. It was meant to 
highlight the historical and cultural achievements of Iran and the Iranians, though observers 
may have been forgiven in thinking that the festivities were designed to highlight the 
achievement of one particular Iranian above all. Unfortunately for the Shah, the attention that 
he received was considerably more negative than he had wished,19 a development not helped 
by the fact that for the rest of the decade the Shah grew increasingly imperious and seemingly 
detached from the realities of the day, crowning this process with an abrupt imperial decree in 
1976 that henceforth Iranians would abandon the Persian-Islamic calendar institutionalised by 
 
17  R. Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet (London, 2009), p. 327. 
18  H. Amini, ‘The Greatest Party in the world’, BBC, interview with Shahrokh Golestan. 
Golestan was responsible for making the festival film. When he showed a copy to the Shah the latter 
reportedly asked, “Where are the people?”. 
19  On the continuing controversy over the cost, see Steele, Shah’s Imperial Celebrations, pp. 
132–7, who provides the most detailed breakdown and suggests that the more exaggerated figures are 





his father in 1924 and replace it with a new ‘Imperial’ calendar dated to the accession of Cyrus 
the Great. Virtually overnight, Iranians discovered that instead of 1355, they were actually 
living in the year 2535. Unsurprisingly this particular act of reckless imperial hubris alienated 
many religious Iranians and incensed the ulema. 
 Rather than basking in Cyrus’ reflected glory, Mohammad Reza Shah found himself 
being held to invented standards that he could not fulfil; and while many Iranians were happy 
to buy into the notion of Cyrus the humanitarian and progenitor of human rights, having had 
first-hand experience of late Pahlavi Iran they were to prove less receptive to the idea that 
Mohammad Reza Shah could be identified with such ideals. Consequently, rather than being 
elevated by his association with Cyrus the Great, the Shah’s attempted identification was to 




If official interest in the Achaemenids declined with the onset of the Islamic Revolution and 
the fall of Mohammad Reza Shah, interest in Cyrus the Great remained remarkably, if at times 
discretely, resilient. The Islamic Revolution had always included a powerful nationalist 
narrative, which was revitalised and increasingly vocalised through the continuation of a war 
with Iraq whose ideology of the conflict with Iran drew on both religious and secular themes. 
The idea that Iraq was prosecuting a new ‘Qadisiyya’, a new Islamic conquest to bring the 
heathen Persians to heal, provoked a nationalist reaction in Iran, which likewise drew on both 
religious and secular motifs, in which, as noted above, the Sasanians enjoyed a gradual if 
emphatic rehabilitation in popular culture and - slowly but surely - within the ideology of the 
state itself, which found itself having to respond to the popular mood. This mood was curiously 





worshippers’, many Iranians seemed happy to absorb some of these elements. Indeed, it was 
not uncommon in popular culture to find Iranian Muslims announce their distinction from the 
Arabs by attesting to the importance of Zoroaster to their world view and belief systems - a 
position that was wholly unorthodox as far as Islamic teachings were concerned. More striking 
than this, however, was the reintegration of Cyrus the Great within the pantheon of Iranian 
heroes. Far from a ‘Jewish’ invention, Cyrus was now being reimagined as a religious leader, 
and in some cases as a one of God’s prophets - an interpretation that appears to have been 
drawn from the Bible.20 
 For more than a decade after the Iran-Iraq war, however, these views of Cyrus remained 
outside the political mainstream, so toxic had the identification of Cyrus with Mohammad Reza 
Shah become within the leadership of the Islamic Republic. It took the maverick Mahmud 
Ahmadinejad to bring Cyrus back into the mainstream with a heady mix of idiosyncratic 
millenarianism that drew heavily on both religious and nationalist motifs, albeit with an 
increasing emphasis on the latter. Ahmadinejad’s populism demanded a response to the 
growing social strength of Iranian nationalism and the popular affectation for all things pre-
Islamic. Moreover, the establishment appears to have become increasingly aware of the 
dangers posed by nationalism and sought to develop a strategy for its appropriation.21 Rather 
than selectively praise the Sasanians for their apparent religiosity and ignore the Achaemenids, 
Ahmadinejad decided that they too needed to be brought in from the cold. There were of course 
limits to what could be officially sanctioned but Ahmadinejad certainly pushed the boundaries 
of acceptability well beyond what his predecessors might have attempted. 
 
20  For the identification of Cyrus with the Quranic Dhul-Qarnayn, see E Merhavy, ‘Religious 
Appropriation of National Symbols in Iran: Searching for Cyrus the Great’, Iranian Studies 48, 6, 
2015, pp. 942-3 
21  ‘Irna be naql az ayatollah haeri shirazi: ma bayad melli-garayi ra be shedat jedi begirim’ 
(Ayatollah Haeri hirazi to IRNA: we should take nationalism very seriously), Ayandehnews.com 18 





 Thus in 2007 he suggested that a visit by regional leaders be taken on a visit to 
Persepolis, an idea that was deemed too similar to the great party of 1971 (details of which had 
since been published in two volumes by the Islamic Republic, under the title of Bazm-e 
Ahriman - the festival of Ahriman), to be remotely acceptable. Unperturbed, Ahmadinejad 
proceeded to display a somewhat oversized copy of the frieze at Persepolis to serve as a 
backdrop for the official state visit of President Putin. Such an overt use of Achaemenid motifs 
were unprecedented in the Islamic Republic, and daresay, outside the parade at Persepolis in 
1971, nothing quite so gaudy had been witnessed under the Pahlavis. But more dramatic 
developments awaited. 
 During the presidency of Mohammad Khatami discussions had taken place with the 
British Museum for a reciprocal loan of artefacts, the first of which would be for an exhibition 
at the British Museum on the Achaemenids entitled ‘Forgotten Empire: The world of Ancient 
Persia’. As it happened the exhibition finally took place after Khatami left office and it was 
officials from the new Ahmadinejad administration who attended the opening. The ostensible 
purposes of the exhibition was to shed a more positive light - through archaeology - on the 
history of an empire that had been traduced by Greek historians, though - in a curious parallel 
with the Shah’s festival of 1971 - this far more modest foray into challenging dominant 
narratives, also engendered a somewhat unforgiving response. One review, titled ‘Evil 
Empire’,22 reflected the difficulties in challenging established narratives. But worse was to 
come. As Ahmadinejad was preparing to welcome President Putin to his mock-up of 
Persepolis, Warner Brothers was about to release its cinematic rendition of the Frank Miller 
graphic novel 300 about the battle of Thermopylae. The depiction of the Persians, not least 
Xerxes, caused some consternation among Iranians and moved the government of 
 
22  J. Jones, ‘The Evil Empire’, The Guardian, 8 September 2005, 





Ahmadinejad to lodge a formal protest at the UN.23 The debate, however, raged on with 
subsequent criticism in 2008, originating in the German news magazine Der Spiegel, which for 
reasons unknown decided to launch a withering attack on the Cyrus Cylinder and the Shah’s 
shameless exploitation of the artefact as a symbol of humanism and charter of human rights.24 
The critique, written in a somewhat sensationalist style, created a good deal of righteous 
indignation among Iranians worldwide, who regarded it as something of an affront to the 
national dignity that the figure of Cyrus should be so diminished.  
 For the Ahmadinejad administration, the furore suggested that the figure of Cyrus the 
Great could serve as another means by which a nationalist motif – and, in this case, icon - the 
Iranian diaspora could be bound to the Islamic Republic, to say nothing of the potential 
advantages with regard to Iranians within the Islamic Republic. To legitimate this process with 
respect to the authorities, however, it was important to reinvent Cyrus in the Islamic Republic’s 
own image and remove any association with the last Shah. The easiest way to do this was 
simply to pick up the narrative that Iranians had been embellishing for some time: the idea of 
Cyrus not only as a champion of human rights, but as a humanist in a profoundly spiritual and 
ultimately Islamic way. In order to make this transition and appropriation smoother, the figure 
of Zolqarnain in the Quran, traditionally ascribed to Alexander the Great, was redirected 
towards Cyrus. But more than that, Cyrus was described in lavish terms as a progenitor of 
 
23  A. Moaveni, ‘300 Sparks Outcry in Iran’, Time, 13 March 2007; M. Joneidi ‘Iranian anger at 
Hollywood ‘assault’’, BBC News Online, 16 March 2007; S. Stalinsky, ‘Iran goes beserk over ‘300’’, 
New York Sun, 23 March 2007; T. Daryaee, ‘Go Tell the Spartans’, Iranian.com, 14 March 2007; the 
controversy over 300 of course followed on from that over Oliver Stone’s Alexander which probably 
irritated the Greeks more than the Iranians.  See, G. Esfandiari, ‘Oliver Stone’s Alexander stirs up 
controversy’, Radio Free Europe, 28 January 2005; the rage continues, see S. Kemali-Dehghan, ‘Iran 
to sue Hollywood over a series of films, including the Oscar winning Argo’, The Guardian, 12 March 
2013. 





monotheism (see Figure 3),25 a man of God, whose governance was never imposed but invited 
by subject peoples. This was not so much Cyrus in the image of the Islamic Republic, but of 
Ahmadinejad himself, whose grandiloquent perception of himself and his role on the world 
stage bore a striking resemblance to Mohammad Reza Shah, and gave ample testimony to the 
reality that the seductive power of Cyrus transcended politics. Indeed, one of his advisors went 
so far as to claim that Ahmadinejad was the Cyrus of the day.26 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 NEAR HERE. LEGEND: Figure 3. 
 
 If Ahmadinejad was prevented by wiser counsel from hosting an event as lavish as the 
Shah’s in honour of Cyrus, he was nonetheless determined to show that on some level he could 
go one better. As part of the agreement with the British Museum, one of the key artefacts that 
the Iranian national museum wanted in return was the loan of the Cyrus Cylinder. This proved 
a particularly tortuous negotiation riven with sensitivities over the wisdom of lending such a 
prized object, in part because some became concerned about the prospects of getting the 
cylinder back - not helped by Iranian commentary that the Cylinder was ‘returning home’ - 
while others were concerned about the political consequences of association with the 
Ahmadinejad government, a problem made more acute by the fiasco surrounding the 
Presidential elections of 2009. A delay was ensured by the sudden discovery of additional 
fragments from another cylinder that might shed light on the original, but finally in 2010 the 
Cylinder made its way to Tehran where it was unveiled with considerable ceremony and no 
 
25  See the Persian newspaper Iran dated 23 July 2013, in which Khamenei’s brother Ayatollah 
Mohammad Khamenei declares that Cyrus and his children promoted monotheism. The interview 
from which this statement is highlighted is a discussion of the ‘inherent’ monotheism of the Iranians. 
26  The claim was made by his Vice President Hamid Baqai and reported in Keyhan, 29 





little emotion on the part of the President. Ahmadinejad was determined to make the most of 
the loan stressing that unlike in 1971 (by his own account) his government did not have to pay 
a penny for the loan, before waxing lyrical on the qualities of Cyrus the Great: 
He issued a statement there. Let me read some part of it and you can see how it 
was. He said, “As long as I am king, I will not allow the people who are under 
my command to mock other nation’s norm or humiliate those nations under my 
rule”. He was saying that he respected other nations. He said, “I will not impose 
my kingdom on any other nations and I will not wage war because they do not 
accept my kingdom”. We know that many nations asked him to rule them…He 
said … “I will not allow anyone to do injustice to others within this span. I will 
restore the rights of the oppressed people and confront oppressors”.27 
 
It says much for the continued mythology of Cyrus the Great - though not of the history - that 
some 39 years after the Shah’s eulogy at Pasargad, Ahmadinejad’s interpretation appears to 
have been drawn from a mixture of Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, and a fake translation of the 
Cylinder circulating on the internet. Cyrus as political myth remained as seductive for the 
leaders of the Islamic Republic, as he had for the Shah. 
 
The Politics of Cyrus 
 
But perhaps one distinction lay with the social grounding of the respective developments. In 
1971, the commemoration of Cyrus was a distinctly elite event, promoted by the Shah and 
supported to a greater or lesser extent by the political elite with a knowledge base that was 
restricted. After the Revolution, however, and partly as a consequence of the Shah’s fateful 
commemoration and the dramatic expansion of education that had occurred, appreciation of 
Cyrus the Great became much more of a social phenomenon. Freed from the shackles of any 
 
27  Ahmadinejad’s interview relating to the cylinder can be viewed here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eaOxn7Igs9A (accessed 17 February 2021); at the official 
unveiling in Tehran in 2010, the cylinder is described by Iranian TV as the first declaration of ‘human 
rights’, a description which would not have gone amiss with the shah, see:  





semblance of intellectual rigour and criticism, the mythology of Cyrus was reinforced in 
popular culture as the ‘father of the nation’, the ‘promulgator of human rights’; even as we have 
seen, the progenitor of ‘monotheism’. Far from having been discarded to the margins of history, 
the cult of Cyrus the Great has rebounded enjoying a social presence that the Shah could have 
never anticipated. Not only do Iranians gather in increasing numbers at the tomb of Cyrus every 
Noruz (the Persian New year which falls on the Spring equinox, 20 March), in an event that can 
be best described as a form of pilgrimage, such that of late the government has decided to 
restrict the gathering for fear that it might acquire a political hue.28 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 NEAR HERE. LEGEND: Figure 4.  
 
 Be that as it may, there have been growing demands for the institutionalisation of a 
‘Cyrus the Great’ day to fall on 29 October – alternatively identified with his birthday or the 
anniversary of his entrance into Babylon (see Figure 4).29 This has become so commonplace 
that the mainstream (semi-official) media in Iran have sought to institutionalise the date,30 while 
foreign powers have sought to exploit the new found fascination with Cyrus the Great by 
offering congratulations (laced with pointed remarks about human rights),31 publicising 
ceremonies of their own – most obviously around the Cyrus Cylinder – and, in the case of Israel, 
 
28  See, for example, ‘Edea-ye ‘maqam-e amniati’ dar bare-ye ‘ehtemal-e eqteshash’ dar 
marasem rooz-e koroush’ (The claims of ‘security officials’ on the ‘likelihood of rioting’ in the 
commemorations of the day of Koroush), Radio Farda, 5 Aban 1396/27 October 2017. 
29  ‘Dar-khast namayande Shiraz baraye bargozari-ye marasem-e rasmi ‘rooz Koroush’ (The 
request of the deputy from Shiraz for the commemoration of an official ‘Day of Koroush’), Radio 
Farda, 5 Aban 1396/27 October 2017. The Persian date is 7 Aban which in 2020 fell on 28 October. 
30  See, for example, ‘Be monasebat zad-rooz koroush-e Kabir’ (On the occasion of the birthday 
of Cyrus the Great), ILNA, 6 Aban 1399/27 October 2020. See also Steele, Shah’s Imperial 
Celebrations, p. 143. 
31  See the congratulations offered by Trump’s special envoy on Iran, Eliott Abrams on 28 






issuing commemorative stamps (see Figure 5).32 Indeed, it is striking that the three countries 
most enamoured with the myth of Cyrus are the United States, Israel and Iran, political rivals 
bound together by a common admiration.33 
 
INSERT FIGURE 5 NEAR HERE. LEGEND: Figure 5. 
  
These developments may be too easily dismissed as a social affectation of little 
consequence to wider political developments. But just as successive rulers have appreciated the 
political value of an association with Cyrus, so too this popular mythology is acquiring a 
political dimension; culture which has always enjoyed a political currency in Iran, is in 
significant ways migrating into its political form. The quintessential ‘myth of the saviour’ is 
returning to its point of origin, and is giving expression to a reinvigorated Iranian nationalism, 
which is not only rooted in Iran’s pre-Islamic traditions, but is crucially identified with powerful 
ideas of emancipation and rights. In order to do this, the figure of Cyrus has himself been 
emancipated from the otherwise suffocating embrace of Mohammad Reza Shah, though it 
should not come as a surprise that the rehabilitation of Cyrus has also accompanied a more 
sympathetic appreciation of the immediate past.  
 In a subtle way, the state appropriation of Cyrus reflects a more controversial desire of 
revolutionaries to reconcile themselves with a past that is no longer regarded as wholly malign. 
 
32  The apparent enthusiasm for the Cyrus Cylinder among the American public when it was 
displayed in various venues in the United States was covered in the Iranian press, ‘Esteqbal 
cheshmgeer-e sharvandan Emrikayi as ‘manshoor-e koroush’’ (the enthusiastic welcome of American 
citizens for the Cyrus Cylinder), ISNA, 5 Farvardin 1392/25 March 2013. See also Steele, Shah’s 
Imperial Celebrations, p. 143 on the unveiling of a ‘cylinder’ monument in Los Angeles in 2018. 
33  Notably, both Presidents Obama and Trump have been identified as ‘latter day Cyrus’, the 
former implicitly, the latter very much explicitly, see ‘Unparalleled privilege: why white evangelicals 
see Trump as their saviour’, The Guardian, 11 January 2020. Trump’s association with Cyrus gained 





At the same time, in political repressed societies, history and historical analogy have served as 
both refuges and means of ‘safe’ political expression.  ‘Cyrus the Great’ may yet prove to be a 
political myth of consequence. Some 45 years after Mohammad Reza Shah exhorted the 
Achaemenid King to ‘sleep easily’, Cyrus is very much present in Iranian (political) culture. 
The people, it would seem, have awoken him. 
 
Ali Ansari 
University of St Andrews 
aa51@st-andrews.ac.uk 
 
